air quality, as well as constraints imposed by current regulatory approaches to water air quality, as well as constraints imposed by current regulatory approaches to water pollution control that limit market function, including the implied assignment of pollution control that limit market function, including the implied assignment of rights to pollute. rights to pollute. This paper seeks to assess the current status of water quality trading and to This paper seeks to assess the current status of water quality trading and to identify possible problems and solutions. We begin with some background on US identify possible problems and solutions. We begin with some background on US water pollution regulation, and then present an informal assessment of the current water pollution regulation, and then present an informal assessment of the current status of water quality trading. We describe six criteria for successful pollution status of water quality trading. We describe six criteria for successful pollution trading programs and consider how these apply to standard water quality problems, trading programs and consider how these apply to standard water quality problems, as compared to air quality. We then highlight some important issues to be resolved as compared to air quality. We then highlight some important issues to be resolved if current water quality trading programs are to function as the "leading edge" of a if current water quality trading programs are to function as the "leading edge" of a new frontier in cost-effective pollution permit trading in the United States. new frontier in cost-effective pollution permit trading in the United States.
Background on US Water Quality Regulation and the Role of Trading
Water quality concerns were a major impetus for the establishment of the Water quality concerns were a major impetus for the establishment of the Environmental Protection Agency in 1970; for example, the infamous fi re on Environmental Protection Agency in 1970; for example, the infamous fi re on the Cuyahoga River near Cleveland, Ohio, occurred in 1969 -though in truth it the Cuyahoga River near Cleveland, Ohio, occurred in 1969 -though in truth it was the tenth such fi re that had occurred since the mid-1800s, and not the worst. was the tenth such fi re that had occurred since the mid-1800s, and not the worst. The Federal Water Pollution Control Act, commonly known as the Clean Water Act, The Federal Water Pollution Control Act, commonly known as the Clean Water Act, became law in 1972. The stated goals of the Clean Water Act were: 1) the attainbecame law in 1972. The stated goals of the Clean Water Act were: 1) the attainment of fi shable and swimmable waters by July 1, 1983; and 2) the elimination of ment of fi shable and swimmable waters by July 1, 1983; and 2) the elimination of all discharges of pollutants into navigable waters by 1985 (Freeman 2000) . Obviously, discharges of pollutants into navigable waters by 1985 (Freeman 2000) . Obviously, those deadlines have been postponed through amendments, and distinctions have those deadlines have been postponed through amendments, and distinctions have since been made between different types of pollutants. However, one should not since been made between different types of pollutants. However, one should not underestimate the degree to which these original goals have infl uenced regulation underestimate the degree to which these original goals have infl uenced regulation under the law. under the law. The Clean Water Act's main tool is a set of effl uent standards, implemented The Clean Water Act's main tool is a set of effl uent standards, implemented through point-source permitting. The National Pollutant Discharge Eliminathrough point-source permitting. The National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) specifi es quantitative effl uent limits by pollutant, for each tion System (NPDES) specifi es quantitative effl uent limits by pollutant, for each point source, based on available control technologies. For the most part, induspoint source, based on available control technologies. For the most part, industrial point source compliance with these permits has been high (Freeman 2000) . trial point source compliance with these permits has been high (Freeman 2000) . Municipal sewage treatment has also expanded dramatically, resulting in impressive Municipal sewage treatment has also expanded dramatically, resulting in impressive improvements in urban water quality-for examples, see Boston Harbor and the improvements in urban water quality-for examples, see Boston Harbor and the Hudson River near New York City. But the gains from point source controls are Hudson River near New York City. But the gains from point source controls are reaching their limits. Even if all point sources were to achieve zero discharge, only reaching their limits. Even if all point sources were to achieve zero discharge, only 10 percent of US river and stream miles would rise one step or more on EPA's water 10 percent of US river and stream miles would rise one step or more on EPA's water quality ladder (Bingham et al. 2000) . quality ladder (Bingham et al. 2000) .
Nonpoint source pollution such as agricultural and urban runoff, atmospheric Nonpoint source pollution such as agricultural and urban runoff, atmospheric deposition, and runoff from forests and mines has become the major concern of deposition, and runoff from forests and mines has become the major concern of water pollution abatement efforts. In fact, nonpoint source pollution from agriculwater pollution abatement efforts. In fact, nonpoint source pollution from agricultural activities is now the tural activities is now the primary source of impairment in US rivers and streams source of impairment in US rivers and streams (US Environmental Protection Agency 2009). Nonpoint source pollution involving (US Environmental Protection Agency 2009). Nonpoint source pollution involving nutrients like nitrogen and phosphorus causes excessive aquatic vegetation and nutrients like nitrogen and phosphorus causes excessive aquatic vegetation and algae growth and eventual decomposition, which deprives deeper waters of oxygen, algae growth and eventual decomposition, which deprives deeper waters of oxygen, creating hypoxic or "dead" zones, fi sh kills, and other damages. This problem is creating hypoxic or "dead" zones, fi sh kills, and other damages. This problem is geographically widespread; seasonal dead zones in US coastal waters affect Puget geographically widespread; seasonal dead zones in US coastal waters affect Puget Sound, the Gulf of Mexico, the Chesapeake Bay, and Long Island Sound. Sound, the Gulf of Mexico, the Chesapeake Bay, and Long Island Sound.
However, agricultural nonpoint source pollution is essentially unregulated by However, agricultural nonpoint source pollution is essentially unregulated by the Clean Water Act, creating a de facto property rights distortion that strongly the Clean Water Act, creating a de facto property rights distortion that strongly affects the ability to attain water quality goals. Although the Act does not address affects the ability to attain water quality goals. Although the Act does not address this issue directly, an important provision is Section 303(d), which requires states to this issue directly, an important provision is Section 303(d), which requires states to establish a Total Maximum Daily Load (TMDL)-basically a "pollution budget"-establish a Total Maximum Daily Load (TMDL)-basically a "pollution budget"-for each water body that does not meet ambient water quality standards for its for each water body that does not meet ambient water quality standards for its designated use, despite point source controls. Designated uses include recreational designated use, despite point source controls. Designated uses include recreational use, public water supply, and industrial water supply, and each designated use has use, public water supply, and industrial water supply, and each designated use has an applicable water quality standard. State courts began ordering the development an applicable water quality standard. State courts began ordering the development of TMDLs in the 1980s and 1990s in response to lawsuits by environmental groups. of TMDLs in the 1980s and 1990s in response to lawsuits by environmental groups.
Since 1996, the states in cooperation with the Environmental Protection Agency Since 1996, the states in cooperation with the Environmental Protection Agency have completed thousands of TMDLs. Establishing a TMDL is a "holistic accounting have completed thousands of TMDLs. Establishing a TMDL is a "holistic accounting exercise" in which all permitted sources and land uses within a watershed drainage exercise" in which all permitted sources and land uses within a watershed drainage area, including agriculture and urban runoff, are inventoried and allocated responarea, including agriculture and urban runoff, are inventoried and allocated responsibility for portions of the pollution budget (Boyd 2000) . sibility for portions of the pollution budget (Boyd 2000) .
While regulators cannot implement enforceable caps on agricultural pollution While regulators cannot implement enforceable caps on agricultural pollution through this process, they have recognized the importance of incorporating agrithrough this process, they have recognized the importance of incorporating agricultural abatement into clean-up processes, and water quality trading is one tool cultural abatement into clean-up processes, and water quality trading is one tool they have employed for this purpose. Not surprisingly, marginal abatement costs for they have employed for this purpose. Not surprisingly, marginal abatement costs for point sources which have faced stringent regulation over the past 40 years tend to point sources which have faced stringent regulation over the past 40 years tend to be high relative to those for nonpoint sources, which have been unregulated. Thus, be high relative to those for nonpoint sources, which have been unregulated. Thus, allowing point sources of water pollution to offset their effl uent, or to trade credits allowing point sources of water pollution to offset their effl uent, or to trade credits for abatement by farms and other entities responsible for nonpoint source pollufor abatement by farms and other entities responsible for nonpoint source pollution, could be cost-effective (Stephenson and Shabman 2011) . In almost all water tion, could be cost-effective (Stephenson and Shabman 2011) . In almost all water quality trading programs established in the United States, the regulatory driver has quality trading programs established in the United States, the regulatory driver has been the establishment (or anticipated establishment) of a Total Maximum Daily been the establishment (or anticipated establishment) of a Total Maximum Daily Load. The US Environmental Protection Agency (2001) estimated that expanded Load. The US Environmental Protection Agency (2001) estimated that expanded use of water quality trading between point and nonpoint sources could reduce use of water quality trading between point and nonpoint sources could reduce compliance costs associated with TMDL regulations by $1 billion or more annually compliance costs associated with TMDL regulations by $1 billion or more annually between 2000 and 2015. between 2000 and 2015.
The Environmental Protection Agency established a "draft framework for The Environmental Protection Agency established a "draft framework for watershed-based trading" in 1996, and many water quality trading programs were watershed-based trading" in 1996, and many water quality trading programs were established during the 1990s. EPA formalized its overarching policy toward water established during the 1990s. EPA formalized its overarching policy toward water quality trading in January 2003 (US Environmental Protection Agency 2003 . At quality trading in January 2003 (US Environmental Protection Agency 2003 . At that time, the agency also funded 11 pilot trading projects across the United States. that time, the agency also funded 11 pilot trading projects across the United States. A few important specifi cs in the 2003 policy continue to shape US water quality A few important specifi cs in the 2003 policy continue to shape US water quality trading programs. First, once a Total Maximum Daily Load has been established, trading programs. First, once a Total Maximum Daily Load has been established, all trading must take place "within a watershed or a defi ned area for which a TMDL all trading must take place "within a watershed or a defi ned area for which a TMDL has been approved." Second, the policy supports trading of nutrients (nitrogen and has been approved." Second, the policy supports trading of nutrients (nitrogen and phosphorus) and sediment, but notes that trading of other pollutants will trigger phosphorus) and sediment, but notes that trading of other pollutants will trigger increased scrutiny and can only be implemented with prior approval. Third, point increased scrutiny and can only be implemented with prior approval. Third, point sources cannot typically use trading to fulfi ll their National Pollutant Discharge sources cannot typically use trading to fulfi ll their National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System permit requirements; instead trading or offsets can only be Elimination System permit requirements; instead trading or offsets can only be applied to a source's effort to comply with the additional TMDL-related restrictions. applied to a source's effort to comply with the additional TMDL-related restrictions. This rule has been relaxed in some cases, allowing some industrial and municipal This rule has been relaxed in some cases, allowing some industrial and municipal point sources-on a case-by-case basis -to purchase water quality abatement from point sources-on a case-by-case basis -to purchase water quality abatement from other sources (usually farms), to reduce their cost of compliance with permits issued other sources (usually farms), to reduce their cost of compliance with permits issued under the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System. under the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System.
Current Status of Water Quality Trading
Water pollution permit trading programs tend to be small, diffuse, and lowWater pollution permit trading programs tend to be small, diffuse, and lowprofi le, and have rarely been comprehensively described and analyzed in the profi le, and have rarely been comprehensively described and analyzed in the peer-reviewed literature. Including active programs and completed or otherwise peer-reviewed literature. Including active programs and completed or otherwise inactive programs, we identify approximately three dozen initiatives. We assessed inactive programs, we identify approximately three dozen initiatives. We assessed the status of current programs using existing sources (Breetz et al. 2004 ; Industrial the status of current programs using existing sources (Breetz et al. 2004; Industrial Economics 2008; Selman, Greenhalgh, Branosky, Jones, and Guiling 2009) We divide these active programs into two categories: those that involve We divide these active programs into two categories: those that involve actual trades, and pure offset programs. As we defi ne them, trading programs must actual trades, and pure offset programs. As we defi ne them, trading programs must involve multiple recipients and multiple sources. The offset programs, by contrast, involve multiple recipients and multiple sources. The offset programs, by contrast, with one exception, all involve a single recipient of water quality credits from one with one exception, all involve a single recipient of water quality credits from one source or multiple sources. Typically, the offset credit recipient invests directly in source or multiple sources. Typically, the offset credit recipient invests directly in credit-generating projects rather than purchasing credits outright. Within each credit-generating projects rather than purchasing credits outright. Within each category, programs in Table 1 are ordered by their year of establishment. category, programs in Table 1 are ordered by their year of establishment. 3 The list of active programs in Table 1 differs considerably from others in the literature. In some cases, programs described as active by earlier researchers are clearly inactive as of 2012; in others, we were not able to gather enough information on program characteristics to justify their inclusion. We were fairly conservative in our defi nition of what counts as an active water quality trading or offset program; a more liberal defi nition would have resulted in closer to 60 such programs (Selman et al. 2009 ). A more comprehensive list of programs including maps showing all trading programs at the state and watershed levels can be found at: http://www.envtn.org/State_Programs___Rules.html.
Active Trading Programs
Nine of the 13 active trading programs in Table 1 have been established since Nine of the 13 active trading programs in Table 1 have been established since 2000, with the remainder established during the 1990s. With the exception of 2000, with the remainder established during the 1990s. With the exception of Australia's Hunter River Basin salinity trading program, the pollutants traded in all Australia's Hunter River Basin salinity trading program, the pollutants traded in all active programs in Table 1 are nutrients, or a combination of nutrients and sediment. active programs in Table 1 are nutrients, or a combination of nutrients and sediment.
We distinguish between three market structures in Table 1 (adapted from We distinguish between three market structures in Table 1 (adapted from  Woodward , Kaiser, and Wicks 2002; Selman, Greenhalgh, Branosky, Jones, and Woodward, Kaiser, and Wicks 2002; Selman, Greenhalgh, Branosky, Jones, and Guiling 2009) : bilateral, clearinghouse, and exchange markets. In bilateral Guiling 2009): bilateral, clearinghouse, and exchange markets. In bilateral programs, participants engage in individual negotiations to arrange trades or programs, participants engage in individual negotiations to arrange trades or offsets. The required one-to-one negotiations lead to higher transaction costs than offsets. The required one-to-one negotiations lead to higher transaction costs than In clearinghouse programs, a single broker or intermediary may generate credits; for example, in the Neuse River program in North Carolina, point-source credits; for example, in the Neuse River program in North Carolina, point-source participants may engage in bilateral trades with other point sources, or they may participants may engage in bilateral trades with other point sources, or they may pay into a state wetland restoration fund, which funds nonpoint source abatement pay into a state wetland restoration fund, which funds nonpoint source abatement projects. The intermediary in a clearinghouse program may also convert the abateprojects. The intermediary in a clearinghouse program may also convert the abatement activities of diffuse nonpoint sources into a uniform "credit currency" that ment activities of diffuse nonpoint sources into a uniform "credit currency" that can be purchased by point sources. For example, in the Great Miami River program can be purchased by point sources. For example, in the Great Miami River program in Ohio, farmers submit applications for "best management practices" projects to in Ohio, farmers submit applications for "best management practices" projects to generate credits, and a public clearinghouse holds a reverse auction to fund the generate credits, and a public clearinghouse holds a reverse auction to fund the most cost-effective projects from these applications. Credits are then allocated to most cost-effective projects from these applications. Credits are then allocated to participating point sources in proportion to their investments in the aggregate participating point sources in proportion to their investments in the aggregate credit bank. Nguyen, Shortle, Reed, and Nguyen (forthcoming) fi nd that a clearcredit bank. Nguyen, Shortle, Reed, and Nguyen (forthcoming) fi nd that a clearinghouse market structure is more effi cient at facilitating trades between point and inghouse market structure is more effi cient at facilitating trades between point and nonpoint sources than bilateral trading. Finally, two active programs, the Hunter nonpoint sources than bilateral trading. Australia, has operated a trading program to control salinity in Wales, in Southeast Australia, has operated a trading program to control salinity in the Hunter River Basin. Sources of salinity include agricultural irrigation, disposal the Hunter River Basin. Sources of salinity include agricultural irrigation, disposal of brine from coal mining, and water diversions for cooling in electricity generaof brine from coal mining, and water diversions for cooling in electricity generation which concentrates salts in the water remaining instream. The river is divided tion which concentrates salts in the water remaining instream. The river is divided into numbered blocks, measured by units of water that will fl ow past Singleton, into numbered blocks, measured by units of water that will fl ow past Singleton, New South Wales (the downstream endpoint of the trading scheme) on a particNew South Wales (the downstream endpoint of the trading scheme) on a particular day. Daily caps are established through continuous monitoring of ambient ular day. Daily caps are established through continuous monitoring of ambient salinity concentrations and fl ow levels, with the goal of meeting a maximum salinity concentrations and fl ow levels, with the goal of meeting a maximum allowable salinity concentration at Singleton. The Hunter River Salinity Trading allowable salinity concentration at Singleton. The Hunter River Salinity Trading Scheme restricts saline discharges by coal mines and power plants to periods when Scheme restricts saline discharges by coal mines and power plants to periods when river fl ows are high, and to amounts less than or equal to a facility's salinity credit river fl ows are high, and to amounts less than or equal to a facility's salinity credit allocation. If discharges exceed credits, participants may purchase credits from allocation. If discharges exceed credits, participants may purchase credits from other facilities. other facilities.
2 The Long Island Sound program is structured as a clearinghouse, where the annual price is set Sound program is structured as a clearinghouse, where the annual price is set by regulators based on the estimated average cost of nitrogen removal among by regulators based on the estimated average cost of nitrogen removal among participating plants. Because source location affects the environmental impact of participating plants. Because source location affects the environmental impact of a unit of nitrogen discharged, the program uses a system of trading ratios based on a unit of nitrogen discharged, the program uses a system of trading ratios based on geographic trading zones. Abatement cost differentials are generally driven by plant geographic trading zones. Abatement cost differentials are generally driven by plant size, as there are signifi cant economies of scale in municipal sewage treatment. The size, as there are signifi cant economies of scale in municipal sewage treatment. The Connecticut Department of Environmental Protection (2010) estimates cost savings Connecticut Department of Environmental Protection (2010) estimates cost savings from trading through 2009 of $300 -$400 million. Though no study has defi nitively from trading through 2009 of $300 -$400 million. Though no study has defi nitively linked the trading program with improved water quality in the Sound (given the linked the trading program with improved water quality in the Sound (given the signifi cant annual variation in water conditions), the general trend of summer signifi cant annual variation in water conditions), the general trend of summer hypoxia incidents is decreasing, despite several years of record-setting warmth since hypoxia incidents is decreasing, despite several years of record-setting warmth since the program began (Connecticut Department of Environmental Protection 2011). the program began (Connecticut Department of Environmental Protection 2011).
3) South Nation River Watershed Trading. A local watershed organization in A local watershed organization in Ontario, Canada, South Nation Conservation, developed a phosphorus trading Ontario, Canada, South Nation Conservation, developed a phosphorus trading program for the South Nation River watershed in 2000. Participants include program for the South Nation River watershed in 2000. Participants include 16 municipal and industrial dairy wastewater lagoon operators, who are allowed to 16 municipal and industrial dairy wastewater lagoon operators, who are allowed to expand their effl uent discharge to waterways only if they invest in offsetting reducexpand their effl uent discharge to waterways only if they invest in offsetting reductions in nonpoint source agricultural runoff. The watershed organization acts as a tions in nonpoint source agricultural runoff. The watershed organization acts as a clearinghouse in this program, collecting payments from dischargers, investing the clearinghouse in this program, collecting payments from dischargers, investing the proceeds in abatement projects that it identifi es on specifi c farms, and distributing proceeds in abatement projects that it identifi es on specifi c farms, and distributing phosphorus credits in exchange. South Nation Conservation estimates that the phosphorus credits in exchange. South Nation Conservation estimates that the trading program reduces abatement costs per kilogram of phosphorus for particitrading program reduces abatement costs per kilogram of phosphorus for participating dischargers by about 40 percent, compared with the traditional wastewater pating dischargers by about 40 percent, compared with the traditional wastewater treatment methods that would otherwise be required (O'Grady 2010). treatment methods that would otherwise be required (O'Grady 2010).
4) Minnesota River Basin Trading. To address low dissolved oxygen levels caused To address low dissolved oxygen levels caused by algae blooms related to high phosphorus concentrations, the Minnesota Pollution by algae blooms related to high phosphorus concentrations, the Minnesota Pollution Control Agency issued in 2005 a single National Pollutant Discharge Elimination Control Agency issued in 2005 a single National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System permit (updated in 2009) for phosphorus discharges to the Minnesota River, System permit (updated in 2009) for phosphorus discharges to the Minnesota River, applicable to 47 permitted sources -mostly municipal sewage treatment plants and applicable to 47 permitted sources -mostly municipal sewage treatment plants and some industrial point sources (Minnesota Pollution Control Agency 2009). While the some industrial point sources (Minnesota Pollution Control Agency 2009). While the general permit does not relieve individual facilities of obligations under individual general permit does not relieve individual facilities of obligations under individual permits before the Total Maximum Daily Load was implemented, it allows facilities permits before the Total Maximum Daily Load was implemented, it allows facilities to trade phosphorus abatement allocations required by the new limit. A system of to trade phosphorus abatement allocations required by the new limit. A system of facility-specifi c trading ratios is used. In 2011, 17 facilities participated in seasonal facility-specifi c trading ratios is used. In 2011, 17 facilities participated in seasonal trades. trades.
5 5 Unlike a market or clearinghouse approach, trades in the Minnesota River Unlike a market or clearinghouse approach, trades in the Minnesota River program are made through bilateral negotiations between point sources. program are made through bilateral negotiations between point sources. Table 1 Table 1 includes three active water quality trading programs related to the 2010 Chesapeake includes three active water quality trading programs related to the 2010 Chesapeake Bay Total Maximum Daily Load, which limits allowable discharges of nitrogen, phosBay Total Maximum Daily Load, which limits allowable discharges of nitrogen, phosphorus, and sediment to rivers and streams in the watershed by six states (Delaware, phorus, and sediment to rivers and streams in the watershed by six states (Delaware, Maryland, New York, Pennsylvania, Virginia, West Virginia) and the District of Maryland, New York, Pennsylvania, Virginia, West Virginia) and the District of Columbia. Pennsylvania, Virginia, and Maryland have chosen to implement water Columbia. Pennsylvania, Virginia, and Maryland have chosen to implement water quality trading programs to reduce compliance costs for the required effl uent abatequality trading programs to reduce compliance costs for the required effl uent abatement, with an additional program under development in West Virginia. A small ment, with an additional program under development in West Virginia. A small amount of nutrient trading had been taking place in some of these states, but the amount of nutrient trading had been taking place in some of these states, but the establishment of these new markets could be a gateway to large-scale trading to establishment of these new markets could be a gateway to large-scale trading to lower compliance costs throughout the region. lower compliance costs throughout the region.
5) State-level trading under the Chesapeake Bay Total Maximum Daily Load.
A prospective study estimated the potential cost savings from water quality A prospective study estimated the potential cost savings from water quality trading to achieve compliance with the Chesapeake Bay Total Maximum Daily Load trading to achieve compliance with the Chesapeake Bay Total Maximum Daily Load at $78 million per year if point sources are allowed to trade only with other point at $78 million per year if point sources are allowed to trade only with other point sources within a river basin and within a state-a 20 percent decrease in costs relative sources within a river basin and within a state-a 20 percent decrease in costs relative to no trading (Van Houtven, Loomis, Baker, Beach, and Casey 2012). However, if to no trading (Van Houtven, Loomis, Baker, Beach, and Casey 2012). However, if trading was allowed watershed-wide across state and basin boundaries and between trading was allowed watershed-wide across state and basin boundaries and between all sources, compliance costs could be reduced by almost half relative to no trading. all sources, compliance costs could be reduced by almost half relative to no trading. The major gains come from allowing trades between point sources and agricultural The major gains come from allowing trades between point sources and agricultural nonpoint sources. nonpoint sources.
Both the Pennsylvania and the Virginia programs allow trading of nitrogen Both the Pennsylvania and the Virginia programs allow trading of nitrogen and phosphorus. Pennsylvania's program, which started in 2010, thus far includes and phosphorus. Pennsylvania's program, which started in 2010, thus far includes municipal sewage treatment plants, counties, industrial point sources, and several municipal sewage treatment plants, counties, industrial point sources, and several brokers or credit aggregators of nonpoint source abatement. Trades are facilitated brokers or credit aggregators of nonpoint source abatement. Trades are facilitated through online auctions or through bilateral negotiation between point and through online auctions or through bilateral negotiation between point and nonpoint sources (Ribaudo and McCann 2012) . In Virginia's program, which nonpoint sources (Ribaudo and McCann 2012) . In Virginia's program, which started in 2011, participating point sources meet their allocations through their started in 2011, participating point sources meet their allocations through their own abatement, purchase of credits from other point sources, or payments made own abatement, purchase of credits from other point sources, or payments made to a state water quality improvement fund used for agricultural abatement projects. to a state water quality improvement fund used for agricultural abatement projects. Trades can either be negotiated bilaterally between point sources, or can be made Trades can either be negotiated bilaterally between point sources, or can be made through a clearinghouse organization of municipal and industrial point sources. through a clearinghouse organization of municipal and industrial point sources.
West Virginia and Maryland are also setting up water quality trading programs West Virginia and Maryland are also setting up water quality trading programs to lower compliance costs. Maryland's program, listed in Table 1 , is quite wellto lower compliance costs. Maryland's program, listed in Table 1 , is quite welldeveloped, though to our knowledge, no trades have yet taken place. developed, though to our knowledge, no trades have yet taken place.
6 6 There is There is little information available on West Virginia's program (and it is likely to be much little information available on West Virginia's program (and it is likely to be much smaller in scale, given that state's relatively small portion of the Chesapeake Bay smaller in scale, given that state's relatively small portion of the Chesapeake Bay watershed), thus it is excluded from Table 1. Current plans suggest that both of watershed), thus it is excluded from Table 1. Current plans suggest that both of these will be exchange markets, which would double the current number of water these will be exchange markets, which would double the current number of water quality trading exchange markets in existence and place three out of four in the quality trading exchange markets in existence and place three out of four in the Chesapeake Bay watershed. Chesapeake Bay watershed.
Trading Programs with Minimal Activity
The remaining seven trading programs in Table 1 are much less active. Some The remaining seven trading programs in Table 1 (Selman, Greenhalgh, Branosky, Jones, and Guiling 2009) . Later in this paper, we consider program design issues that may and Guiling 2009). Later in this paper, we consider program design issues that may limit trading. limit trading.
Active Offset Programs
Most of the active US water quality offset programs in Table 1 were created Most of the active US water quality offset programs in Table 1 were created through a modifi cation to a single National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System through a modifi cation to a single National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System permit, giving a regulated point source the fl exibility to more cheaply reduce permit, giving a regulated point source the fl exibility to more cheaply reduce discharge and achieve compliance through direct investments in abatement projects discharge and achieve compliance through direct investments in abatement projects outside its own facility. The active US offset programs were established between 1997 outside its own facility. The active US offset programs were established between 1997 and 2008. Of the US programs, all but Bear Creek, a very small annual phosphorus and 2008. Of the US programs, all but Bear Creek, a very small annual phosphorus trading arrangement between two Colorado municipal sewage treatment facilitrading arrangement between two Colorado municipal sewage treatment facilities, involve a single point source offsetting nutrient-related permit requirements ties, involve a single point source offsetting nutrient-related permit requirements through investments in off-site abatement. All but one are bilateral exchanges, through investments in off-site abatement. All but one are bilateral exchanges, where the regulated point source negotiates directly with farms regarding investwhere the regulated point source negotiates directly with farms regarding investment in projects suffi cient to meet its permit requirements. ment in projects suffi cient to meet its permit requirements.
Since the programs are generally quite similar, a few examples suffi ce for Since the programs are generally quite similar, a few examples suffi ce for description of program design. In the Alpine Cheese Company program, a cheese description of program design. In the Alpine Cheese Company program, a cheese manufacturer was required, as part of its plan to expand production, to reduce phosmanufacturer was required, as part of its plan to expand production, to reduce phosphorus discharge from its wastewater treatment plant from 225 parts-per-million phorus discharge from its wastewater treatment plant from 225 parts-per-million to 1 part-per-million. Through a treatment plant upgrade, the company reduced to 1 part-per-million. Through a treatment plant upgrade, the company reduced phosphorus discharge to 3 parts-per-million. The cost of reducing further to 1 partphosphorus discharge to 3 parts-per-million. The cost of reducing further to 1 partper-million was suffi ciently high that the fi rm sought to achieve these remaining per-million was suffi ciently high that the fi rm sought to achieve these remaining reductions through investments in nonpoint source agricultural abatement (Wood reductions through investments in nonpoint source agricultural abatement (Wood 2011). Thus, the company paid 25 local dairy farmers to reduce phosphorus 2011). Thus, the company paid 25 local dairy farmers to reduce phosphorus discharge. In a much larger program, the Southern Minnesota Beet Sugar Cooperadischarge. In a much larger program, the Southern Minnesota Beet Sugar Cooperative, a beet processor, pays its 256 grower-members to invest in phosphorus-reducing tive, a beet processor, pays its 256 grower-members to invest in phosphorus-reducing land management changes so that the processor can meet its permit requirements land management changes so that the processor can meet its permit requirements for expanded production (Werblow 2007; Fang, Easter, and Brezonik 2005) . In this for expanded production (Werblow 2007; Fang, Easter, and Brezonik 2005) . In this case, the beet growers and the processing facility are treated under the processor's case, the beet growers and the processing facility are treated under the processor's permit as a single source to meet an overarching phosphorus effl uent cap. The strucpermit as a single source to meet an overarching phosphorus effl uent cap. The structure of Wisconsin's Red Cedar River program is similar, except that the regulated ture of Wisconsin's Red Cedar River program is similar, except that the regulated point source investor is a municipal wastewater treatment plant, which pays local point source investor is a municipal wastewater treatment plant, which pays local farmers to reduce discharge, thereby avoiding a costly treatment plant upgrade. farmers to reduce discharge, thereby avoiding a costly treatment plant upgrade. Table 3 offers descriptive information on 12 additional trading and offset Table 3 offers descriptive information on 12 additional trading and offset programs that are currently inactive. In some cases, a very small amount of trading programs that are currently inactive. In some cases, a very small amount of trading or offset activity occurred before the programs became inactive (for example, or offset activity occurred before the programs became inactive (for example, Grassland Area Farmers Tradable Loads Program, Lake Dillon Trading Program). Grassland Area Farmers Tradable Loads Program, Lake Dillon Trading Program). In other cases, early studies suggested that trading was unlikely to be successful, so In other cases, early studies suggested that trading was unlikely to be successful, so programs were never formally implemented (for example, Vermillion River, Nonprograms were never formally implemented (for example, Vermillion River, NonTidal Passaic River Trading Program, Charles River Flow Trading Program). In the Tidal Passaic River Trading Program, Charles River Flow Trading Program). In the remaining cases inactivity has been due to a number of factors including delays in remaining cases inactivity has been due to a number of factors including delays in the development of the Total Maximum Daily Load due to litigation, unresolved the development of the Total Maximum Daily Load due to litigation, unresolved scientifi c modeling issues, or lack of demand for pollution credits. In the next scientifi c modeling issues, or lack of demand for pollution credits. In the next section of this paper, where we discuss criteria for successful trading systems, we section of this paper, where we discuss criteria for successful trading systems, we consider the limitations of some of these programs in more detail. consider the limitations of some of these programs in more detail.
Inactive or Completed Trading and Offset Programs Inactive or Completed Trading and Offset Programs

Applying Criteria for Successful Pollution Permit Trading Systems to Water
The primary objective of any trading program is to meet or exceed the environThe primary objective of any trading program is to meet or exceed the environmental goal at least cost. The environmental goal is best achieved if two conditions mental goal at least cost. The environmental goal is best achieved if two conditions are met: a) the pollutant is uniformly mixed to avoid the potential for hot spots; and are met: a) the pollutant is uniformly mixed to avoid the potential for hot spots; and b) the pollutant can be easily measured and monitored, allowing enforcement to b) the pollutant can be easily measured and monitored, allowing enforcement to be effective at deterring noncompliance. The cost-effectiveness goal is best achieved be effective at deterring noncompliance. The cost-effectiveness goal is best achieved if three additional conditions are met: c) sources have signifi cant cost differentials if three additional conditions are met: c) sources have signifi cant cost differentials so that the potential gains from trade are large; d) the number of polluting sources so that the potential gains from trade are large; d) the number of polluting sources is large enough and the regulatory driver stringent enough to generate suffi cient is large enough and the regulatory driver stringent enough to generate suffi cient trading volume; and e) there is fl exibility in when, where, and how reductions and trading volume; and e) there is fl exibility in when, where, and how reductions and trades are made. trades are made.
7 7 In this section, we discuss challenges related to these fi ve criteria In this section, we discuss challenges related to these fi ve criteria in the case of water quality trading, as well as possible solutions. in the case of water quality trading, as well as possible solutions.
Uniformly Mixed Pollutants and Non-uniform Mixing
In the case of climate change, the location of greenhouse gas reductions is In the case of climate change, the location of greenhouse gas reductions is not important, since these gases are uniformly mixed-that is, the environmental not important, since these gases are uniformly mixed-that is, the environmental impact of a ton emitted in one location is equal to the impact of a ton emitted elseimpact of a ton emitted in one location is equal to the impact of a ton emitted elsewhere. In contrast, marginal damages from water pollution may vary dramatically where. In contrast, marginal damages from water pollution may vary dramatically Montgomery's (1972) original article introducing the theory of markets for pollution control considered original article introducing the theory of markets for pollution control considered the case of non-uniform mixing and developed a trading-ratio-based system. the case of non-uniform mixing and developed a trading-ratio-based system. Several current water trading programs use systems of trading ratios to ensure Several current water trading programs use systems of trading ratios to ensure that credits traded have equivalent impacts on the water quality problem of concern that credits traded have equivalent impacts on the water quality problem of concern at a particular location or set of locations. Examples include the three largest active at a particular location or set of locations. Examples include the three largest active programs discussed in the previous section: nitrogen trading in Long Island Sound, programs discussed in the previous section: nitrogen trading in Long Island Sound, salinity trading in Australia's Hunter River Basin, and phosphorus trading in the salinity trading in Australia's Hunter River Basin, and phosphorus trading in the Minnesota River. Minnesota River.
The cost savings from trading, relative to a prescriptive uniform standard, The cost savings from trading, relative to a prescriptive uniform standard, are reduced when trading ratios are introduced (they are, after all, constraints are reduced when trading ratios are introduced (they are, after all, constraints on trade). However, getting trading ratios right can also increase the benefi ts of on trade). However, getting trading ratios right can also increase the benefi ts of water quality regulation if high-damage sources also have high abatement costs water quality regulation if high-damage sources also have high abatement costs and, without trading ratios, would engage in little abatement when the option to and, without trading ratios, would engage in little abatement when the option to purchase (cheaper) permits is available. Thus, this is an important concern not just purchase (cheaper) permits is available. Thus, this is an important concern not just for cost-effectiveness, but for effi ciency as well. In sum, while non-uniform mixing for cost-effectiveness, but for effi ciency as well. In sum, while non-uniform mixing poses a system design problem that may be generally more signifi cant for water poses a system design problem that may be generally more signifi cant for water pollution than for air pollution problems, the problem can be addressed in plaupollution than for air pollution problems, the problem can be addressed in plausible ways. sible ways.
Measurement, Monitoring, and Enforcement
Effl uent from point sources of water pollution, like wastewater treatment Effl uent from point sources of water pollution, like wastewater treatment plants, is easily measured and monitored. However, the large potential gains from plants, is easily measured and monitored. However, the large potential gains from trade in water quality will likely be realized in systems where point sources are trade in water quality will likely be realized in systems where point sources are net buyers of abatement by nonpoint sources, since these sources are the "lownet buyers of abatement by nonpoint sources, since these sources are the "lowhanging fruit" of water pollution abatement options. The measurement and hanging fruit" of water pollution abatement options. The measurement and monitoring of water pollution from nonpoint sources is challenging, however. monitoring of water pollution from nonpoint sources is challenging, however. In at least one case, the inactive Boulder Creek Trading Program, inconclusive In at least one case, the inactive Boulder Creek Trading Program, inconclusive evidence for the effectiveness of agricultural pollution controls was a direct reason evidence for the effectiveness of agricultural pollution controls was a direct reason for the program's failure. for the program's failure.
There are three main sources of uncertainty in measuring and monitoring There are three main sources of uncertainty in measuring and monitoring nonpoint source pollution. First, nonpoint source pollution is inherently more nonpoint source pollution. First, nonpoint source pollution is inherently more stochastic than point source pollution, because it depends more heavily on stochastic than point source pollution, because it depends more heavily on weather-related factors such as rainfall and temperature (Shortle and Dunn weather-related factors such as rainfall and temperature (Shortle and Dunn 1986) . Second, there may be scientifi c or technical uncertainty regarding the 1986). Second, there may be scientifi c or technical uncertainty regarding the effectiveness of abatement projects affecting nonpoint sources, which can lead effectiveness of abatement projects affecting nonpoint sources, which can lead actual reductions to be less than expected (Harrington et al. 1985) . Third, the actual reductions to be less than expected (Harrington et al. 1985) . Third, the technical estimation of expected abatement may be correct, but fl aws in a project's technical estimation of expected abatement may be correct, but fl aws in a project's implementation and/or operation (institutional uncertainty) may produce less implementation and/or operation (institutional uncertainty) may produce less abatement than expected. abatement than expected.
Regulators have typically dealt with these uncertainties by requiring more than Regulators have typically dealt with these uncertainties by requiring more than one unit of abatement in nonpoint source pollution in exchange for each credit one unit of abatement in nonpoint source pollution in exchange for each credit toward abatement of point source pollution. These requirements are typically toward abatement of point source pollution. These requirements are typically referred to as "trading ratios," a term that economists use to describe the systems referred to as "trading ratios," a term that economists use to describe the systems of exchange rates used to account for locational differences in damages from of exchange rates used to account for locational differences in damages from pollution. However, economic theory does not necessarily support the use of high pollution. However, economic theory does not necessarily support the use of high trading ratios between point and nonpoint sources to address uncertainty. Indeed, trading ratios between point and nonpoint sources to address uncertainty. Indeed, the optimal trading ratio from point to nonpoint sources could be either greater the optimal trading ratio from point to nonpoint sources could be either greater than or less than 1:1 in the presence of stochastic pollutant loading (Shortle 1990 ; than or less than 1:1 in the presence of stochastic pollutant loading (Shortle 1990; Malik, Letson, and Crutchfi eld 1993) . If regulators are risk-averse, then investments Malik, Letson, and Crutchfi eld 1993). If regulators are risk-averse, then investments to reduce nonpoint source pollution are doubly benefi cial from the perspective to reduce nonpoint source pollution are doubly benefi cial from the perspective of social welfare, because nonpoint source pollution imposes both direct damages of social welfare, because nonpoint source pollution imposes both direct damages from pollution and additional risk, given its inherently stochastic nature (Horan from pollution and additional risk, given its inherently stochastic nature (Horan 2001) . Thus, regulators seeking to address this aspect of uncertainty ought to skew 2001). Thus, regulators seeking to address this aspect of uncertainty ought to skew trades in favor of reductions in nonpoint source pollution, rather than against them trades in favor of reductions in nonpoint source pollution, rather than against them (Shortle 1990; Malik, Letson, and Crutchfi eld 1993) . Alternatively, one might try to (Shortle 1990; Malik, Letson, and Crutchfi eld 1993) . Alternatively, one might try to defi ne water pollution abatement credits in terms of defi ne water pollution abatement credits in terms of expected units of abatement, units of abatement, which consider both the mean and the variance of nonpoint source abatement which consider both the mean and the variance of nonpoint source abatement (Horan and Shortle 2011) . (Horan and Shortle 2011) .
Scientifi c or technical uncertainty, in contrast, may be more effi ciently Scientifi c or technical uncertainty, in contrast, may be more effi ciently handled through improved liability rules. Segerson and Wu (2006) suggest a hybrid handled through improved liability rules. Segerson and Wu (2006) suggest a hybrid instrument that includes an ambient tax imposed if nonpoint source abatement instrument that includes an ambient tax imposed if nonpoint source abatement projects do not result in real reductions. Regulatory agencies might also develop a projects do not result in real reductions. Regulatory agencies might also develop a preapproved list of "best management practices" for agricultural nonpoint source preapproved list of "best management practices" for agricultural nonpoint source reductions, which gives point sources certainty over the amount of credit for a reductions, which gives point sources certainty over the amount of credit for a specifi c investment (Schary and Fisher-Vanden 2004) . Regulatory agencies could specifi c investment (Schary and Fisher-Vanden 2004) . Regulatory agencies could also fund implementation of pilot projects and new scientifi c research to resolve also fund implementation of pilot projects and new scientifi c research to resolve some uncertainty. some uncertainty.
The current approach, in contrast, stacks the deck against nonpoint source The current approach, in contrast, stacks the deck against nonpoint source reductions. Consider the point/nonpoint source trading ratios (reported in Table 2) reductions. Consider the point/nonpoint source trading ratios (reported in Table 2 ) for the many programs that involve this component, ranging from 1:1 to 4:1 for for the many programs that involve this component, ranging from 1:1 to 4:1 for active trading programs, and from 2:1 to almost 8:1 for active offset programs. active trading programs, and from 2:1 to almost 8:1 for active offset programs. 8 8 In In addition, it may discourage trades that could have reduced pollution and lowered addition, it may discourage trades that could have reduced pollution and lowered compliance costs. For example, Ontario's South Nation trading program uses a compliance costs. For example, Ontario's South Nation trading program uses a 4:1 trading ratio. As a result, while the cost per kilogram of phosphorus removal 4:1 trading ratio. As a result, while the cost per kilogram of phosphorus removal through nonpoint sources is 85 percent lower than traditional wastewater treatment through nonpoint sources is 85 percent lower than traditional wastewater treatment by point sources, with the 4:1 trading ratio, the cost saving per pound of phosphorus by point sources, with the 4:1 trading ratio, the cost saving per pound of phosphorus abatement is only about 40 percent (see Environment Canada, n.d.). abatement is only about 40 percent (see Environment Canada, n.d.).
The diffi culty of measuring nonpoint source pollution abatement clearly The diffi culty of measuring nonpoint source pollution abatement clearly makes enforcement diffi cult, too. Imposing liability rules if promised abatement makes enforcement diffi cult, too. Imposing liability rules if promised abatement does not occur provides one potential mechanism for dealing with this problem. does not occur provides one potential mechanism for dealing with this problem. However, unlike the air case, where the performance and effectiveness risk of projHowever, unlike the air case, where the performance and effectiveness risk of projects to generate emission credits is borne by credit sellers, in many water quality ects to generate emission credits is borne by credit sellers, in many water quality trading programs involving trades between point and nonpoint sources, liability trading programs involving trades between point and nonpoint sources, liability for nonperformance or ineffectiveness lies with point-source credit buyers. Some for nonperformance or ineffectiveness lies with point-source credit buyers. Some attribute low trading volumes in current water quality trading programs to this probattribute low trading volumes in current water quality trading programs to this problematic assignment of liability (Stephenson and Shabman 2011; Jarvie and Solomon lematic assignment of liability (Stephenson and Shabman 2011; Jarvie and Solomon 1998) . However, the current liability structure of trading is a refl ection of the fact 1998). However, the current liability structure of trading is a refl ection of the fact that agricultural sources are unregulated, and the Environmental Protection that agricultural sources are unregulated, and the Environmental Protection Agency can only impose penalties on permitted point sources through the National Agency can only impose penalties on permitted point sources through the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System. Pollutant Discharge Elimination System.
Private bilateral contracts between point and nonpoint sources could include Private bilateral contracts between point and nonpoint sources could include provisions that subject nonpoint sources to penalties for nonperformance, though provisions that subject nonpoint sources to penalties for nonperformance, though the transaction costs associated with this approach would be high. As an alternathe transaction costs associated with this approach would be high. As an alternative, in some "clearinghouse" water quality trading programs -like Ontario's South tive, in some "clearinghouse" water quality trading programs -like Ontario's South Nation River program, and the Great Miami River program in Ohio -the same Nation River program, and the Great Miami River program in Ohio -the same public or nonprofi t third parties that facilitate trades may also assume liability in public or nonprofi t third parties that facilitate trades may also assume liability in the case of nonperformance by nonpoint sources. Finally, in other programs, such the case of nonperformance by nonpoint sources. Finally, in other programs, such as the Pennsylvania Nutrient Credit Trading program, private for-profi t brokers or as the Pennsylvania Nutrient Credit Trading program, private for-profi t brokers or credit aggregators work directly with agricultural nonpoint sources on abatement, credit aggregators work directly with agricultural nonpoint sources on abatement, and then sell credits to point sources, assuming liability for nonperformance. and then sell credits to point sources, assuming liability for nonperformance.
Abatement Cost Differentials
The larger the differences in marginal abatement costs, the greater the potenThe larger the differences in marginal abatement costs, the greater the potential gains from trading pollution permits (Newell and Stavins 2003) . Such cost tial gains from trading pollution permits (Newell and Stavins 2003) . Such cost differentials among point sources may stem from differences in industrial sector, differentials among point sources may stem from differences in industrial sector, process, technology, or other source characteristics. Abatement cost differentials process, technology, or other source characteristics. Abatement cost differentials can be large between point sources of water pollution: three of the most signifi cant can be large between point sources of water pollution: three of the most signifi cant water quality trading programs discussed earlier (Hunter River, Long Island Sound, water quality trading programs discussed earlier (Hunter River, Long Island Sound, and Minnesota River) all involve exclusively trades between point sources. However, and Minnesota River) all involve exclusively trades between point sources. However, at least two of the inactive programs mentioned in Table 3 , the Vermillion River and at least two of the inactive programs mentioned in Table 3 , the Vermillion River and Non-Tidal Passaic River programs, failed to mature due to insuffi cient abatement Non-Tidal Passaic River programs, failed to mature due to insuffi cient abatement cost heterogeneity among potential participants. cost heterogeneity among potential participants.
More signifi cant gains from trade are likely to come from trades between More signifi cant gains from trade are likely to come from trades between point and nonpoint sources. Faeth (2000) summarizes the list of control options point and nonpoint sources. Faeth (2000) summarizes the list of control options for both point and nonpoint sources of phosphorous, and generates a least-cost for both point and nonpoint sources of phosphorous, and generates a least-cost curve for reducing phosphorous in three watersheds. In each case, reductions of up curve for reducing phosphorous in three watersheds. In each case, reductions of up to 50 percent can be achieved through low-cost changes in agricultural practices. to 50 percent can be achieved through low-cost changes in agricultural practices. After this point, the least-cost curve rises sharply, as low-cost agricultural options After this point, the least-cost curve rises sharply, as low-cost agricultural options are exhausted and higher-cost point source controls (phosphorus removal and are exhausted and higher-cost point source controls (phosphorus removal and fi ltration) are implemented. Faeth (2000) estimates that savings of 40 -80 percent in fi ltration) are implemented. Faeth (2000) estimates that savings of 40 -80 percent in the per-pound cost of phosphorus removal are achievable through trading between the per-pound cost of phosphorus removal are achievable through trading between point and nonpoint sources. If US water quality trading programs are to expand point and nonpoint sources. If US water quality trading programs are to expand signifi cantly, particularly in smaller watersheds, they will need to increase possibilisignifi cantly, particularly in smaller watersheds, they will need to increase possibilities for trading or offsets between point and nonpoint sources. ties for trading or offsets between point and nonpoint sources.
Suffi cient Trading Volume
Adoption of permit trading for air pollutants has, in most cases, been prompted Adoption of permit trading for air pollutants has, in most cases, been prompted by a signifi cant increase in regulatory stringency, creating demand for permits by a signifi cant increase in regulatory stringency, creating demand for permits among regulated entities. For example, the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 among regulated entities. For example, the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 used tradable pollution permits to achieve a required 50 percent reduction in sulfur used tradable pollution permits to achieve a required 50 percent reduction in sulfur dioxide emissions from coal-fi red power plants, and the European Union Emissions dioxide emissions from coal-fi red power plants, and the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme was born of a need to meet European nations' carbon dioxide Trading Scheme was born of a need to meet European nations' carbon dioxide emissions reduction targets under the Kyoto Protocol. In contrast, during the era emissions reduction targets under the Kyoto Protocol. In contrast, during the era in which pollution trading has been widely accepted and practiced, the goals of in which pollution trading has been widely accepted and practiced, the goals of the Clean Water Act have been relatively unchanged, with the important excepthe Clean Water Act have been relatively unchanged, with the important exception of the Total Maximum Daily Load provisions. These "pollution budgets" for tion of the Total Maximum Daily Load provisions. These "pollution budgets" for impaired water bodies have been the most important regulatory impetus for water impaired water bodies have been the most important regulatory impetus for water quality trading in the United States. In fact, the regulatory driver for all but two of quality trading in the United States. In fact, the regulatory driver for all but two of the US trading programs in Table 1 was the development or anticipated developthe US trading programs in Table 1 was the development or anticipated development of a TMDL. The two exceptions are the Colorado programs -Cherry Creek ment of a TMDL. The two exceptions are the Colorado programs -Cherry Creek and Chatfi eld Reservoir-both of which were prompted by the state environmental and Chatfi eld Reservoir-both of which were prompted by the state environmental regulatory agency's development of a total maximum annual load for nutrients, a regulatory agency's development of a total maximum annual load for nutrients, a very similar framework. very similar framework.
However, disputes over Total Maximum Daily Loads have affected the ability However, disputes over Total Maximum Daily Loads have affected the ability of this regulatory driver to prompt trading activity. Litigation over the scientifi c of this regulatory driver to prompt trading activity. Litigation over the scientifi c models that underlie the development of these pollution budgets is common. In the models that underlie the development of these pollution budgets is common. In the Upper Middle Snake Rock Subbasin program in Idaho, and the Willamette PartnerUpper Middle Snake Rock Subbasin program in Idaho, and the Willamette Partnership program ("Counting on the Environment") in Oregon, litigation over TMDLs ship program ("Counting on the Environment") in Oregon, litigation over TMDLs prevented the initiation of trading programs. In other cases, backlogs in TMDL prevented the initiation of trading programs. In other cases, backlogs in TMDL development for impaired water bodies and delays that occur for other reasons development for impaired water bodies and delays that occur for other reasons can prevent trading programs from operating. For example, Idaho's Lower Boise can prevent trading programs from operating. For example, Idaho's Lower Boise River Effl uent Trading program began development in 1998. Trading was initially River Effl uent Trading program began development in 1998. Trading was initially expected to commence by 2001, but a downstream TMDL (for the Snake River/ expected to commence by 2001, but a downstream TMDL (for the Snake River/ Hell's Canyon) was not approved until 2004. An "implementation plan" was subseHell's Canyon) was not approved until 2004. An "implementation plan" was subsequently prepared for the Lower Boise in lieu of a TMDL, but the Environmental quently prepared for the Lower Boise in lieu of a TMDL, but the Environmental Protection Agency discourages water quality trading without an offi cial TMDL. Protection Agency discourages water quality trading without an offi cial TMDL. Given that the Snake River TMDL calls for a 79 percent reduction in phosphorus Given that the Snake River TMDL calls for a 79 percent reduction in phosphorus loading from the Lower Boise, the inability to use water quality trading to bring down loading from the Lower Boise, the inability to use water quality trading to bring down the costs of such a large pollution reduction will likely have signifi cant economic the costs of such a large pollution reduction will likely have signifi cant economic implications. But without a strong regulatory driver, the demand for permits simply implications. But without a strong regulatory driver, the demand for permits simply does not materialize. does not materialize.
Even where regulation is suffi cient to prompt market creation, existing water Even where regulation is suffi cient to prompt market creation, existing water quality trading markets do not generally have a large number of buyers and sellers in quality trading markets do not generally have a large number of buyers and sellers in comparison to their counterparts in air pollution regulation. While it operated, the comparison to their counterparts in air pollution regulation. While it operated, the sulfur dioxide allowance trading program comprised approximately 2,500 sources. sulfur dioxide allowance trading program comprised approximately 2,500 sources. In contrast, of the six signifi cant programs described in detail earlier, the numbers In contrast, of the six signifi cant programs described in detail earlier, the numbers of trading participants (thus far) are as follows: Hunter River, 23 point sources; of trading participants (thus far) are as follows: Hunter River, 23 point sources; Long Island Sound, 79 point sources; South Nation, 16 point sources, plus a single Long Island Sound, 79 point sources; South Nation, 16 point sources, plus a single clearinghouse; Minnesota River, 45 point sources; Pennsylvania Nutrient Credit clearinghouse; Minnesota River, 45 point sources; Pennsylvania Nutrient Credit Trading, nine point sources and three brokers for nonpoint sources of effl uent; and Trading, nine point sources and three brokers for nonpoint sources of effl uent; and Virginia's Chesapeake Bay Watershed Nutrient Credit Exchange, 34 point sources, Virginia's Chesapeake Bay Watershed Nutrient Credit Exchange, 34 point sources, plus the clearinghouse and a few nonpoint source participants. plus the clearinghouse and a few nonpoint source participants.
Thin participation in these programs could be attributed to the restriction Thin participation in these programs could be attributed to the restriction of trading within watershed boundaries or simply to the fact that some of the of trading within watershed boundaries or simply to the fact that some of the programs are quite new. Nonetheless, even after accounting for the small number programs are quite new. Nonetheless, even after accounting for the small number of participants, trading volume has been strikingly low. A number of other explaof participants, trading volume has been strikingly low. A number of other explanations have been offered, some already discussed: some farmers do not trust nations have been offered, some already discussed: some farmers do not trust the programs, even if participation may be to their fi nancial benefi t (Breetz, the programs, even if participation may be to their fi nancial benefi t (Breetz, Fisher-Vanden, Jacobs, Schary 2005) ; liability rules may discourage participation Fisher-Vanden, Jacobs, Schary 2005); liability rules may discourage participation of point sources (Stephenson and Shabman 2011; Jarvie and Solomon 1998) ; of point sources (Stephenson and Shabman 2011; Jarvie and Solomon 1998) ; lack of regulatory stringency may limit demand (King and Kuch 2003) ; and the lack of regulatory stringency may limit demand (King and Kuch 2003) ; and the existence of agricultural subsidies for nutrient reductions, which may substitute existence of agricultural subsidies for nutrient reductions, which may substitute for participation in trading programs, could hamper supply of credits (King and for participation in trading programs, could hamper supply of credits (King and Kuch 2003) . In the future, if comprehensive Total Maximum Daily Loads are Kuch 2003) . In the future, if comprehensive Total Maximum Daily Loads are developed for very large watersheds-the 2010 Chesapeake Bay TMDL is a good developed for very large watersheds-the 2010 Chesapeake Bay TMDL is a good example-these markets may grow to encompass many more participants than example-these markets may grow to encompass many more participants than has been the norm. has been the norm.
Trading Flexibility
An optimal approach to pollution trading is fi rst to allocate allowances to An optimal approach to pollution trading is fi rst to allocate allowances to sources and then to grant full discretion to these sources to decide how reductions sources and then to grant full discretion to these sources to decide how reductions will be made. Shabman and Stephenson (2007) distinguish between two types of will be made. Shabman and Stephenson (2007) distinguish between two types of fl exibility: waste control fl exibility, which allows the source to decide how reducfl exibility: waste control fl exibility, which allows the source to decide how reductions will be made; and exchange fl exibility, which allows sources to trade across tions will be made; and exchange fl exibility, which allows sources to trade across time and location. Although water quality trading, in most cases, allows for waste time and location. Although water quality trading, in most cases, allows for waste control fl exibility, exchange fl exibility is limited. Sources are not typically allowed control fl exibility, exchange fl exibility is limited. Sources are not typically allowed to trade across watershed boundaries or time, and trades are subject to discounting to trade across watershed boundaries or time, and trades are subject to discounting through trading ratios. There are logical reasons for some of these restrictions, through trading ratios. There are logical reasons for some of these restrictions, often involving non-uniform mixing over space and time. For example, hypoxia often involving non-uniform mixing over space and time. For example, hypoxia from nutrient pollution tends to be a warm-weather phenomenon, thus regulators from nutrient pollution tends to be a warm-weather phenomenon, thus regulators may not want to allow ambient reductions in winter months to be banked to allow may not want to allow ambient reductions in winter months to be banked to allow higher discharge in summer months. That said, exchange restrictions do reduce higher discharge in summer months. That said, exchange restrictions do reduce trading volumes and potential cost savings. trading volumes and potential cost savings.
One particular issue of infl exibility is that in trades involving point and One particular issue of infl exibility is that in trades involving point and nonpoint sources, nonpoint sources may be required to prove that reductions nonpoint sources, nonpoint sources may be required to prove that reductions have been made before credit is awarded to point sources. In most water quality have been made before credit is awarded to point sources. In most water quality offset programs, regulators must approve each credit purchase by point sources offset programs, regulators must approve each credit purchase by point sources through modifi cation of their existing permits, raising transaction costs signifithrough modifi cation of their existing permits, raising transaction costs significantly and stifl ing the cost-effectiveness potential of this approach (Schary and cantly and stifl ing the cost-effectiveness potential of this approach (Schary and Fisher-Vanden 2004) . The preapproval requirement adds to transaction costs Fisher-Vanden 2004) . The preapproval requirement adds to transaction costs and inhibits trading. and inhibits trading.
Policy Recommendations and Future Research
Since 1990, the Environmental Protection Agency, prodded by the courts, has Since 1990, the Environmental Protection Agency, prodded by the courts, has pushed forward on the development and enforcement of ambient Total Maximum pushed forward on the development and enforcement of ambient Total Maximum Daily Load "pollution budgets" for impaired water bodies. At the same time, Daily Load "pollution budgets" for impaired water bodies. At the same time, the EPA has shown increasing support for experimentation with market-based the EPA has shown increasing support for experimentation with market-based approaches applied to water pollution control, including water quality trading and approaches applied to water pollution control, including water quality trading and offset programs. offset programs.
Some of these water quality trading programs face natural limits. For example, Some of these water quality trading programs face natural limits. For example, the offset programs summarized at the bottom of Table 1 are small-scale examples the offset programs summarized at the bottom of Table 1 are small-scale examples of what is achievable through more fl exible regulatory approaches under the of what is achievable through more fl exible regulatory approaches under the Clean Water Act, but they generally involve case-by-case negotiation between point Clean Water Act, but they generally involve case-by-case negotiation between point sources and regulators, resulting in unique modifi cations to a single discharge sources and regulators, resulting in unique modifi cations to a single discharge permit, or a very small set of permits. The cost savings from this approach will permit, or a very small set of permits. The cost savings from this approach will always be disappointing in comparison to the potential savings from larger-scale always be disappointing in comparison to the potential savings from larger-scale trading programs envisioned by regulators in their promotion of water quality trading programs envisioned by regulators in their promotion of water quality trading (US Environmental Protection Agency 2001 . Given the very high trading (US Environmental Protection Agency 2001 . Given the very high transaction costs associated with such an approach, it is unlikely that these offset transaction costs associated with such an approach, it is unlikely that these offset programs will expand to make a signifi cant dent in the total cost of compliance programs will expand to make a signifi cant dent in the total cost of compliance with US water quality regulations. with US water quality regulations.
There is greater cause for optimism when we consider the trading programs There is greater cause for optimism when we consider the trading programs summarized at the top of Table 1 , particularly those active programs described in summarized at the top of Table 1 , particularly those active programs described in detail earlier in the paper. However, the active programs developed thus far are detail earlier in the paper. However, the active programs developed thus far are signifi cantly thinner than what might be optimal from an economic perspective. signifi cantly thinner than what might be optimal from an economic perspective. The reasons for this can be described along the two primary dimensions raised The reasons for this can be described along the two primary dimensions raised at the beginning of the paper: 1) challenges due to the physical characteristics of at the beginning of the paper: 1) challenges due to the physical characteristics of water pollution problems; and 2) challenges posed by the implied rights to pollute water pollution problems; and 2) challenges posed by the implied rights to pollute created by the current regulatory environment. We summarize these primary chalcreated by the current regulatory environment. We summarize these primary challenges below and note that some are easier to surmount than others. lenges below and note that some are easier to surmount than others.
Challenges Inherent to Water Quality Problems
Damages from water pollution can vary signifi cantly with the location of the Damages from water pollution can vary signifi cantly with the location of the discharge, in contrast to the more straightforward cases described by economists in discharge, in contrast to the more straightforward cases described by economists in the original theory of environmental policy instrument choice, and in contrast to the original theory of environmental policy instrument choice, and in contrast to many of the applications of cap-and-trade programs thus far (to greenhouse gases many of the applications of cap-and-trade programs thus far (to greenhouse gases and, to some extent, sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxides). This spatial heterogeneity and, to some extent, sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxides). This spatial heterogeneity inherent to water quality problems requires water quality trading programs to instiinherent to water quality problems requires water quality trading programs to institute spatial trading ratios, zones, or other mechanisms to ensure that environmental tute spatial trading ratios, zones, or other mechanisms to ensure that environmental goals are met. This is a surmountable problem and has been addressed both in goals are met. This is a surmountable problem and has been addressed both in theory and in practice. theory and in practice.
A related problem has to do with the spatial scope of trading programs. Due in A related problem has to do with the spatial scope of trading programs. Due in part to the problem of location-specifi c damages, water quality trading takes place part to the problem of location-specifi c damages, water quality trading takes place within specifi c watersheds, limiting the potential number of participating sources, within specifi c watersheds, limiting the potential number of participating sources, abatement cost heterogeneity, and other market dimensions (US Environmental abatement cost heterogeneity, and other market dimensions (US Environmental Protection Agency 2003) . An obvious way to increase trading volume is to combine Protection Agency 2003) . An obvious way to increase trading volume is to combine multiple Total Maximum Daily Loads across watersheds (Faeth 2000) to the extent multiple Total Maximum Daily Loads across watersheds (Faeth 2000) to the extent allowed by the particular water quality problem under concern. A recent example is allowed by the particular water quality problem under concern. A recent example is the broad Chesapeake Bay TMDL, which encompasses the Potomac, Susquehanna, the broad Chesapeake Bay TMDL, which encompasses the Potomac, Susquehanna, James, and Rappahannock river basins (and fi ve smaller basins), to address hypoxia James, and Rappahannock river basins (and fi ve smaller basins), to address hypoxia related to nutrient runoff in the Bay. This single TMDL has given rise to nascent related to nutrient runoff in the Bay. This single TMDL has given rise to nascent trading programs in at least three states and may be a model for a broader vision of trading programs in at least three states and may be a model for a broader vision of how trading can work for particular regional water quality problems. The challenge how trading can work for particular regional water quality problems. The challenge within such systems is to ensure that local upstream water quality standards are met within such systems is to ensure that local upstream water quality standards are met (for example, in the Chesapeake Bay's individual river basins) while reducing the (for example, in the Chesapeake Bay's individual river basins) while reducing the cost of achieving regional water quality goals (in the Bay, itself) as much as possible cost of achieving regional water quality goals (in the Bay, itself) as much as possible through trading. through trading.
Another related issue is that nonpoint source pollution-the most signifi cant Another related issue is that nonpoint source pollution-the most signifi cant remaining source of water pollution in the United States and many industrialremaining source of water pollution in the United States and many industrialized countries, and the source of the lowest-cost abatement opportunities for ized countries, and the source of the lowest-cost abatement opportunities for many contaminants -is characterized by signifi cant uncertainty in measurement many contaminants -is characterized by signifi cant uncertainty in measurement and monitoring. Unfortunately, to address this uncertainty, regulators often and monitoring. Unfortunately, to address this uncertainty, regulators often require two, three, four, or more times as much in abatement from nonpoint require two, three, four, or more times as much in abatement from nonpoint sources in exchange for a reduction of one unit in point source discharge. This sources in exchange for a reduction of one unit in point source discharge. This is not the economically optimal way to address such uncertainty, and in recent is not the economically optimal way to address such uncertainty, and in recent interviews conducted as part of a water quality trading evaluation, respondents interviews conducted as part of a water quality trading evaluation, respondents suggested that this approach was a major barrier to increased point-nonpoint suggested that this approach was a major barrier to increased point-nonpoint source trading (Industrial Economics 2008). Several potential solutions have been source trading (Industrial Economics 2008). Several potential solutions have been offered: regulators can develop a preapproved list of "best management practices" offered: regulators can develop a preapproved list of "best management practices" for reducing agricultural nonpoint source pollution, with accepted performance for reducing agricultural nonpoint source pollution, with accepted performance metrics (Schary and Fisher-Vanden 2004) ; trading programs could denominate metrics (Schary and Fisher-Vanden 2004) ; trading programs could denominate abatement units that incorporate both the mean and variance of expected abateabatement units that incorporate both the mean and variance of expected abatement in nonpoint sources (Horan and Shortle 2011) ; and point-nonpoint source ment in nonpoint sources (Horan and Shortle 2011) ; and point-nonpoint source trading could be accompanied by a tax that kicks in if nonpoint source pollution trading could be accompanied by a tax that kicks in if nonpoint source pollution is not reduced as projected (Segerson and Wu 2006) . Only the fi rst of these three is not reduced as projected (Segerson and Wu 2006) . Only the fi rst of these three solutions has been applied in practice, but even where regulators develop a preapsolutions has been applied in practice, but even where regulators develop a preapproved list of best management practices, they still require more than one unit of proved list of best management practices, they still require more than one unit of abatement from these efforts in exchange for one unit of credit to the purchasing abatement from these efforts in exchange for one unit of credit to the purchasing point source. point source.
Challenges Due to Implicit Rights to Pollute and Other Regulatory Barriers
Perhaps the most signifi cant barrier to expanding water quality trading in Perhaps the most signifi cant barrier to expanding water quality trading in the United States (and, indeed, to improving water quality at all) is the effective the United States (and, indeed, to improving water quality at all) is the effective exclusion of agricultural nonpoint sources from direct water quality regulation. exclusion of agricultural nonpoint sources from direct water quality regulation. As a result, these large collective contributors to water quality problems are not As a result, these large collective contributors to water quality problems are not obligated to abate, and must instead be offered incentives to engage in abatement. obligated to abate, and must instead be offered incentives to engage in abatement. This exclusion seems at present to be politically nonnegotiable. The water quality This exclusion seems at present to be politically nonnegotiable. The water quality implications of agricultural runoff are dealt with primarily by the US Department implications of agricultural runoff are dealt with primarily by the US Department of Agriculture through federal subsidies for best management practices designed of Agriculture through federal subsidies for best management practices designed to entice farmers to produce environmental quality along with their other outputs. to entice farmers to produce environmental quality along with their other outputs. The use of Total Maximum Daily Loads in combination with water quality trading The use of Total Maximum Daily Loads in combination with water quality trading offers a mechanism for improving water quality in a more cost-effective manner, by offers a mechanism for improving water quality in a more cost-effective manner, by allowing regulated point sources with much higher abatement costs to purchase allowing regulated point sources with much higher abatement costs to purchase credits from nonpoint sources. credits from nonpoint sources.
However, this approach has its limits. First, recall that little remains to be However, this approach has its limits. First, recall that little remains to be achieved through point source abatement in many US rivers and streams (Bingham achieved through point source abatement in many US rivers and streams (Bingham et al. 2000) . Thus, it is not just the low-hanging fruit that is in short supply among et al. 2000). Thus, it is not just the low-hanging fruit that is in short supply among point sources of water pollution; the fruit, altogether, is becoming scarce. In many point sources of water pollution; the fruit, altogether, is becoming scarce. In many watersheds, the remaining point source pollution problem is not a signifi cant fraction watersheds, the remaining point source pollution problem is not a signifi cant fraction of overall pollution, the vast majority of which is contributed by nonpoint sources. of overall pollution, the vast majority of which is contributed by nonpoint sources. Thus, even if point sources are required to purchase many units of nonpoint source Thus, even if point sources are required to purchase many units of nonpoint source reductions for every unit of credit they receive (as most programs are structured), reductions for every unit of credit they receive (as most programs are structured), the net result for water quality may not be a signifi cant improvement. the net result for water quality may not be a signifi cant improvement.
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Second, though participation in water quality trading programs would appear Second, though participation in water quality trading programs would appear to be in many farmers' fi nancial interest, it has often proven diffi cult to encourage to be in many farmers' fi nancial interest, it has often proven diffi cult to encourage them to participate. Many farmers have a historic mistrust of regulators, or they may them to participate. Many farmers have a historic mistrust of regulators, or they may worry that the monitoring required for participation in water quality trading is a worry that the monitoring required for participation in water quality trading is a step toward full incorporation in the regulatory structure; thus, it may be necessary step toward full incorporation in the regulatory structure; thus, it may be necessary to work through trusted third parties or existing relationships such as cooperatives to work through trusted third parties or existing relationships such as cooperatives or irrigation districts to deal with these issues (Breetz, Fisher-Vanden, Jacobs, and or irrigation districts to deal with these issues (Breetz, Fisher-Vanden, Jacobs, and Schary 2005) . In addition, the federal US Department of Agriculture subsidies for Schary 2005). In addition, the federal US Department of Agriculture subsidies for water quality measures on farms are often an appealing alternative to participation in water quality measures on farms are often an appealing alternative to participation in water quality trading, limiting farmers' interest in participation. Program objectives water quality trading, limiting farmers' interest in participation. Program objectives differ signifi cantly from those of water pollution regulation under the Clean Water differ signifi cantly from those of water pollution regulation under the Clean Water Act, so combining them would be diffi cult (Breetz and Fisher-Vanden 2007) . For Act, so combining them would be diffi cult (Breetz and Fisher-Vanden 2007) . For example, one concern is whether and how farmers should "double dip," receiving example, one concern is whether and how farmers should "double dip," receiving Department of Agriculture subsidy payments as well as payments from credit buyers Department of Agriculture subsidy payments as well as payments from credit buyers in a water quality trading program (Woodward 2011; Horan, Shortle, and Abler in a water quality trading program (Woodward 2011; Horan, Shortle, and Abler 2004) . Economists have proposed reasonably low-information ways to deal with the 2004). Economists have proposed reasonably low-information ways to deal with the problem of uncertain nonpoint source pollution fl ows in the context of a water problem of uncertain nonpoint source pollution fl ows in the context of a water pollution tax (Segerson 1988; Xepapadeas 1991 Xepapadeas , 1992 ; Herriges, Govindasamy, and pollution tax (Segerson 1988; Xepapadeas 1991 Xepapadeas , 1992 Herriges, Govindasamy, and Shogren 1994; Horan, Shortle, and Abler 1998; Hansen 1998) . Working out how a Shogren 1994; Horan, Shortle, and Abler 1998; Hansen 1998) . Working out how a water pollution abatement subsidy (like those received by farmers from US Departwater pollution abatement subsidy (like those received by farmers from US Department of Agriculture programs) might be integrated with a trading system in which ment of Agriculture programs) might be integrated with a trading system in which credit buyers face an enforced cap would be an important step forward. credit buyers face an enforced cap would be an important step forward.
Third, aside from the distortions introduced by the exclusion of major agriThird, aside from the distortions introduced by the exclusion of major agricultural pollution sources from the "caps" represented by ambient water quality cultural pollution sources from the "caps" represented by ambient water quality standards, there are other challenges to expanding water pollution trading related to standards, there are other challenges to expanding water pollution trading related to the structure of regulations. Interviewees in a recent water quality trading program the structure of regulations. Interviewees in a recent water quality trading program evaluation suggest that the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System permitevaluation suggest that the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System permitting process should be modifi ed and made more fl exible to better support trading ting process should be modifi ed and made more fl exible to better support trading (Industrial Economics 2008) . Currently, when a point source wishes to use purchased (Industrial Economics 2008) . Currently, when a point source wishes to use purchased credits to offset a portion of the discharge limit specifi ed in its permit, all effl uent credits to offset a portion of the discharge limit specifi ed in its permit, all effl uent covered in the entire permit must be reopened for discussion. However, there are covered in the entire permit must be reopened for discussion. However, there are now some examples in which a single permit has been issued for a particular contamnow some examples in which a single permit has been issued for a particular contaminant, across many point sources. These "aggregate permits" are similar to "emissions inant, across many point sources. These "aggregate permits" are similar to "emissions bubble" approaches for air quality in that permitted sources are jointly responsible bubble" approaches for air quality in that permitted sources are jointly responsible for meeting a standard and may engage in cost-reducing trades in order to do this. for meeting a standard and may engage in cost-reducing trades in order to do this. Aggregate permits are critical to the functioning of promising water quality trading Aggregate permits are critical to the functioning of promising water quality trading programs in the Tar-Pamlico, Neuse, and Minnesota Rivers. programs in the Tar-Pamlico, Neuse, and Minnesota Rivers.
Beyond these specifi c suggestions for addressing structural challenges related Beyond these specifi c suggestions for addressing structural challenges related to water quality problems themselves and to the institutions that manage them, to water quality problems themselves and to the institutions that manage them, some of the larger water quality trading programs could be analyzed empirically. some of the larger water quality trading programs could be analyzed empirically. Such measurement after the programs have taken place occurs only rarely in Such measurement after the programs have taken place occurs only rarely in regulatory settings and was only incorporated into routine US regulatory funcregulatory settings and was only incorporated into routine US regulatory functions in January 2011 (Executive Order No. 13563, 2011) . Little is known, however, tions in January 2011 (Executive Order No. 13563, 2011) . Little is known, however, about how well any of these trading programs has actually worked in terms of about how well any of these trading programs has actually worked in terms of both environmental impacts and abatement cost savings, though there is a good both environmental impacts and abatement cost savings, though there is a good before-the-program analysis of the potential cost savings from trading under the before-the-program analysis of the potential cost savings from trading under the Chesapeake Bay program as a whole (Van Houtven, Loomis, Baker, Beach, and Chesapeake Bay program as a whole (Van Houtven, Loomis, Baker, Beach, and Casey 2012) . The Hunter River, Long Island Sound, and Minnesota River programs Casey 2012). The Hunter River, Long Island Sound, and Minnesota River programs may be particularly good candidates for such analysis, since they are reasonably may be particularly good candidates for such analysis, since they are reasonably large and have been operating for several years. If more were known quantitatively large and have been operating for several years. If more were known quantitatively about environmental outcomes and cost-effectiveness, regulators might demonabout environmental outcomes and cost-effectiveness, regulators might demonstrate more fl exibility in the future design and implementation of water quality strate more fl exibility in the future design and implementation of water quality trading programs. trading programs.
Similarly, the development of effi cient and effective trading programs could Similarly, the development of effi cient and effective trading programs could be helped by new fi eld research targeted at developing a better understanding be helped by new fi eld research targeted at developing a better understanding of factors such as: the effectiveness of nonpoint source controls; the impact of of factors such as: the effectiveness of nonpoint source controls; the impact of behavioral incentives for farmers to engage in trading with point sources of water behavioral incentives for farmers to engage in trading with point sources of water pollution; or the potential for alternative approaches such as trading in the mean pollution; or the potential for alternative approaches such as trading in the mean and variance of pollution or the use of nonperformance taxes as an alternative to and variance of pollution or the use of nonperformance taxes as an alternative to high point-nonpoint source trading ratios that hamper trading. Field experimentahigh point-nonpoint source trading ratios that hamper trading. Field experimentation using randomization is particularly useful in sorting out policy complications tion using randomization is particularly useful in sorting out policy complications like these that may be hard to understand or control (List 2011) . like these that may be hard to understand or control (List 2011).
The scope for water quality trading will always be signifi cantly smaller than The scope for water quality trading will always be signifi cantly smaller than for permit trading related to air quality for reasons inherent to water pollution for permit trading related to air quality for reasons inherent to water pollution problems, such as the need to limit some trading programs to within a watershed, problems, such as the need to limit some trading programs to within a watershed, signifi cant non-uniform mixing of pollutants, and diffi culties in measuring and signifi cant non-uniform mixing of pollutants, and diffi culties in measuring and monitoring nonpoint sources. However, the economic performance of marketmonitoring nonpoint sources. However, the economic performance of marketbased instruments in practice-regardless of the environmental objective-may based instruments in practice-regardless of the environmental objective-may always be disappointing relative to the theoretical ideal (Tietenberg 1990 ). Many always be disappointing relative to the theoretical ideal (Tietenberg 1990 ). Many current barriers to expanding trading regionally have more to do with program current barriers to expanding trading regionally have more to do with program design than the physical characteristics of water pollution, and can potentially design than the physical characteristics of water pollution, and can potentially be overcome. Today's trading programs may serve as important laboratories for be overcome. Today's trading programs may serve as important laboratories for researchers in economics, supporting analysis that leads to better future program researchers in economics, supporting analysis that leads to better future program design and eventual expansion in the use of these cost-effective policy instruments. design and eventual expansion in the use of these cost-effective policy instruments.
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